Auto lenders were perhaps the biggest winners of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform. Cars depreciate quickly, so borrowers often owe more than their car is worth. Prior to the Reform, these borrowers could reduce the principal on their auto loan to the market value of the car through a "cramdown" in Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Reform prohibited cramdowns during the first two and a half years of an auto loan. This paper is the first to estimate the causal effect of this anticramdown provision on the price and quantity of auto credit. The authors use a novel empirical strategy that relies on the fact that eliminating cramdowns affected only one of the two types of consumer bankruptcy: Chapter 13. They exploit persistent historical variation in states' usage of Chapter 13 generated by differences in local legal culture. Using difference-in-differences regressions, their empirical strategy compares pre-Reform and post-Reform auto loans across states with persistent historical differences in the share of bankruptcies filed under Chapter 13. They find that eliminating cramdowns decreased interest rates on auto loans in the average state by 15 basis points, with a larger decline in states where Chapter 13 is more common. The decline in interest rates occurs in the exact month that the Reform went into effect, and the authors rule out other aspects of the Reform as possible causes. Next, the authors estimate the effect on the quantity of auto credit. Using quarterly data from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel based on Equifax credit reports, they examine the effect of eliminating cramdowns on the number and size of new auto loans. The estimates show a small, negative, and insignificant impact on the number of new auto loans. The authors do find some evidence, however, that loan sizes increased among subprime borrowers.
Introduction
The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) introduced the most significant changes to bankruptcy law in thirty years. BAPCPA aimed to curtail "abusive" or "strategic" bankruptcy filings by restricting access to bankruptcy and reducing the benefits of filing. Proponents of the law argued that strategic bankruptcies increased the cost of consumer credit, claiming that bankruptcy was costing families as much as $400 each year through higher interest rates (Warren, 2004) . The restrictions placed on bankruptcy in BAPCPA were intended to provide a partial rebate of this cost by reducing the price of credit (Block-Lieb and Janger, 2006) . Critics, however, were skeptical about whether creditors' gains from BAPCPA would be passed on to consumers.
1 In this paper, we examine whether BAPCPA's restrictions on bankruptcy led to lower interest rates and increased loan originations for one type of consumer credit: auto loans.
We focus on auto loans for two reasons. First, many consider auto lenders to be the biggest winners of BAPCPA (Braud, 2009 , Leonhard, 2014 , Whitford, 2007 . Reflecting on the first five years of BAPCPA, Bankruptcy Judge Keith Lundin remarked, "That's exactly where all the money went; it's going to the car lenders" (Diehl et al., 2010) . The reason auto lenders benefited is that BAPCPA essentially prohibited what is known as a "cramdown."
Cars depreciate quickly, so many borrowers will owe more than their car is worth. Prior to BAPCPA, a bankruptcy filer could reduce the principal on an undersecured auto loan to the market value of the car through a "cramdown" in bankruptcy. Auto lenders claimed that these cramdowns resulted in losses of hundreds of millions of dollars each year (Hamburger, 1 See Letter from 110 Law Professors to Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner and Hon. John Conyers, Jr. (March 11, 2005) in 151 Congressional Record H1974 and Simkovic (2009). average share of bankruptcies under Chapter 13 for the four years before BAPCPA, which captures the persistent tendency to file Chapter 13 relative to Chapter 7. We interact this measure with an indicator for the post-BAPCPA period to estimate how changes in auto loans upon BAPCPA vary with states' Chapter 13 usage. While Chapter 13 usage is potentially endogenous, state-level fixed effects hold constant the time-invariant factors in states that generate the variation in Chapter 13 usage. We also use high-frequency data, which allows us to examine changes in auto credit that occur immediately around BAPCPA.
Our interest rate data, from a large survey of banks conducted by Bankrate.com, consist of monthly state-level average interest rates on 48-month new car loans. An advantage of the Bankrate.com survey is that interest rates are quoted for an auto loan with fixed characteristics, which allows us to estimate the impact on interest rates, holding other terms of the loan constant. Our data on credit quantity are from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Consumer Credit Panel (CCP)/Equifax data, a large, nationally representative, quarterly panel on consumer debts drawn from Equifax credit reports. We construct two measures of credit quantity: the number of new auto loans and the average size of new auto loans. Information on borrowers' Equifax Risk Score in the CCP also allows us to test whether high-risk borrowers were more affected by the law change.
We find that eliminating cramdowns in BAPCPA reduced the interest rate on 48-month auto loans by 15 basis points in the average state. In states in the highest quintile of Chapter 13 usage, interest rates fell by 30 basis points, while in states in the lowest quintile, they fell by 5 basis points. To investigate whether the timing of these changes coincide with BAPCPA, we estimate an event-study specification. The event-study estimates lend credibility to our identification strategy by showing that, prior to BAPCPA, interest rates in high-13 and low-13 states were trending similarly. That is, changes in interest rates prior to BAPCPA were uncorrelated with historical Chapter 13 usage. Then, in the exact month that BAPCPA went into effect, interest rates fell sharply in states where Chapter 13 was historically more common.
A remaining concern is that BAPCPA introduced several changes to the bankruptcy system in addition to the anti-cramdown provision. BAPCPA increased fees that attorneys charge for filing, implemented a means test that restricts access to Chapter 7 for high-income filers, and reduced the protection of homestead exemptions. We rule out these other channels as possible explanations for the decline in auto loan interest rates. Specifically, our result is robust to controls that allow the impact of BAPCPA to vary with states' average bankruptcy filing rates, exposure to the means test, changes in attorneys' fees, and homestead exemption levels.
Next, we estimate the impact of eliminating cramdowns on the number of new auto loans and the average size of new auto loans. Proponents of the anti-cramdown provision argued that it would lead to increased access to credit, especially for low-income households (MacArthur, 2009) . The identification strategy remains the same, but since the CCP contains more detailed geographic variation, we conduct the analysis at the level of the federal court districts. This allows us to use variation in persistent Chapter 13 usage across bankruptcy court districts within a state in addition to the cross-state variation. We find no statistically significant increases in the number or size of new auto loans as a result of eliminating cramdowns. However, it is possible that the impact on the quantity of credit is concentrated on high-risk households, since they are more likely to file for bankruptcy. We find eliminating cramdowns increased the size of new auto loans to subprime borrowers relative to prime borrowers, though the inclusion of state-specific time trends causes this result to become statistically insignificant.
Our paper contributes to two strands of research. First, it adds to the literature examining the impact of BAPCPA. We provide the first estimates of the causal effect of eliminating cramdowns on auto loan interest rates and credit quantity. Eliminating cramdowns caused a decline in auto loan interest rates, which supports proponents' claims that BAPCPA would lead to more favorable lending terms. Other research has found mixed evidence on the impact of BAPCPA on lending terms for other types of loans. Ang and Jimenez (2014) and Darolia and Ritter (2015) examine the impact of BAPCPA on private student loans and find that, by making these loans non-dischargeable, BAPCPA increased the supply available to high-risk borrowers. But Ang and Jimenez (2014) also find that interest rates on private student loans increased. Another set of papers focus on the negative effects of BAPCPA on consumers in financial distress. Albanesi and Nosal (2015) show that the increased costs of filing for bankruptcy led to fewer bankruptcy filings and increased court judgments and debt in collections. Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2012) and Li, White, and Zhu (2011) show that BAPCPA increased sub-prime foreclosures by making it more difficult to discharge unsecured debt in bankruptcy.
2 Second, our paper contributes to the literature studying how consumer credit markets 2 While Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2012) focuses on BAPCPA's impact on foreclosures, the longer working paper version also examines the impact of BAPCPA on auto loan interest rates, though they examine a different aspect of BAPCPA than our paper (Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch, 2009) . Using the variation in asset exemption levels across states, they find that auto loan interest rates fell more in highexemption states after BAPCPA. Their estimate captures the effect of aspects of BAPCPA that matter more in high-exemption states. But since high exemptions make it easier to file Chapter 7, and cramdowns are not available in Chapter 7, cramdowns should matter less in high exemption states (all else equal). In contrast, our paper isolates the causal effect of the anti-cramdown provision of BAPCPA using variation in Chapter 13 bankruptcy usage across states. In robustness checks in Section 4.2, we show that our result is robust to including the controls for asset exemption levels (the variation used in Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2009) respond to bankruptcy laws. Much of the empirical research estimates the impact of asset exemption levels. Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) show that states with more debtor-friendly asset exemptions have higher interest rates, less credit available to low-asset households, and more loan denials. Other research has found similar effects for small business loans and unsecured credit (Berkowitz and White, 2004 , Berger, Cerqueiro, and Penas, 2011 , Severino, Brown, and Coates, 2015 .
3 Most similar to ours, recent empirical work has found that eliminating mortgage cramdowns in bankruptcy in the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in lower interest rates and small increases in loan approval rates (Goodman and Levitin, 2014, Li, Tewari, and White, 2014) . Our paper contributes to this literature by examining a new aspect of bankruptcy law: the elimination of auto loan cramdowns. We also introduce a new source of variation in BAPCPA: persistent differences in local legal culture across states.
Persistent variation in local legal culture is important in its own right, and can potentially be used to to identify the impact of other changes in federal bankruptcy law.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system. Section 3 gives details about the data and an overview of the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
Consumer Bankruptcy
This section provides an overview of the bankruptcy system and changes made by BAPCPA.
In the United States, bankruptcy filers choose between liquidation under Chapter 7 or a repayment plan under Chapter 13. In Chapter 7, the filer's assets are sold, except for specific assets exempted by state statutes, and the proceeds are given to creditors. In return, most unsecured debts are discharged and the filer is protected from future collection activities. In
Chapter 13, the filer does not give up assets, but instead enters a three-to five-year repayment plan. Upon completion of the plan, most remaining unsecured debts are discharged and the filer is protected from future collection activities.
The Chapter 13 repayment plan, which must be approved by the bankruptcy judge, details the payments that the debtor will make to creditors. Typically, secured lenders are repaid the full amount (though at a reduced interest rate), while unsecured creditors receive little (Norberg, 1999) . 4 Prior to BAPCPA, one advantage of filing Chapter 13 was that the debtor could cramdown an underwater auto loan (i.e. a loan that is for more than the value of the vehicle). A cramdown splits the loan into two claims: a secured claim equal to the market value of the car and an unsecured claim equal to the remaining balance. For example, if a Chapter 13 filer owed $15,000 on a car only worth $10,000, a cramdown would split the loan into a $10,000 secured claim and a $5,000 unsecured claim. Since unsecured claims are repaid at a lower rate in a Chapter 13, auto lenders took losses on the underwater portion of the loan. While data on how much auto lenders lost through cramdowns is unavailable, rough estimates of annual losses were in the range of several hundred million to over one billion dollars (Hamburger, 2001 , Lundin, 2005 . BAPCPA prohibited the cramdown of most auto loans that were less than 910 days old. 5 Now, to retain the vehicle, the debtor must repay the entire loan as a secured debt. As a result, the anti-cramdown provision increased the payouts to auto lenders in Chapter 13 bankruptcies.
Across states, the fraction of consumer bankruptcies filed under Chapter 13 varies from less than 10% to over 60%. While this variation is partly due to differences in the financial incentives of filers and state laws, research suggests that much of it is due to local legal culture, i.e. the way that attorneys, judges, and trustees in different states apply the uniform federal bankruptcy code (Braucher, 1993 , Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, 1994 , Lefgren and McIntyre, 2009 Sullivan, and Summers (2015) provides empirical evidence of the importance of these institutional differences, finding that 5.4% of the cross-sectional variation in Chapter 13 usage can be attributed to differences in the fee that the bankruptcy courts allow lawyers to receive for filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Since cramdowns only affected
Chapter 13, the impact of eliminating cramdowns will be larger in states where Chapter 13 is more common.
While varying widely across states, Chapter 13 usage is stable within a state over time.
The plots in Figure 1 In addition to eliminating cramdowns, BAPCPA introduced several other major changes to the bankruptcy system. 8 First, the monetary cost of filing for bankruptcy increased by an average of 25% for Chapter 13 and 38% for Chapter 7 (Lupica, 2012) . Second, debtors with incomes over the median income in their state, adjusted for family size, may be prohibited from filing Chapter 7 by the "means test." Third, BAPCPA attempted to curb abuse of homestead exemptions by limiting the amount that could be exempted on newly purchased homes or by filers who recently moved to a state. Fourth, in determining how much to repay through the Chapter 13 plan, BAPCPA replaced debtor and court discretion with a formula requiring debtors to forfeit all disposable income to creditors (Hildebrand III, 2006) . When describing the empirical strategy in Section 3, we discuss how these additional provisions of BAPCPA could affect our results and how we address these concerns.
Data and Empirical Strategy
The anti-cramdown provision made auto lending more profitable by increasing the amount that lenders receive when a borrower files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. If lenders are pricing 7 Cornwell and Xu (2014) finds that the means test and restrictions on exemptions each increased the Chapter 13 share by 3-4 percentage points.
8 See White (2007) for a more detailed account of the changes in BAPCPA.
in the risk of cramdowns, the anti-cramdown provision of BAPCPA will cause an increase in the supply of credit and lower interest rates. However, eliminating cramdowns could also increase the costs of holding an underwater car loan, which may reduce demand for auto loans by risk-averse borrowers. To the extent that borrowers' responses affect interest rates (conditional on the borrowers' observable characteristics) and credit quantities, our estimates will reflect the equilibrium response of supply and demand.
We estimate the effect of auto loan cramdowns on three outcomes: auto loan interest rates, the share of borrowers obtaining a new auto loan, and the average size of new auto loans. We hypothesize that the increased supply and possible decreased demand for auto loans will cause interest rates to fall. The predicted direction of the change in quantity, however, is ambiguous. A decrease in demand for auto loans from risk-averse borrowers may offset an increase in credit supply.
Data
The interest rate data consist of monthly state-level interest rate averages for 48-month new car loans from Bankrate.com. Bankrate.com is a leading aggregator and publisher of personal financial content and continually surveys approximately 4,800 banks and thrifts in all 50 states. The survey asks lenders about interest rates quoted for a $22,000, 48-month loan to a consumer with a 700 or higher FICO score for the purchase of a new car with a 10% down payment. Therefore, our estimates will reflect the change in interest rates, holding the other loan characteristics fixed. Our data consists of the average interest rate charged in each state based on Bankrate.com's survey for the last day of each month. The institutions included in the average can differ from day to day depending on which institutions are surveyed. For the main sample, we use a 6-month window around the enactment of BAPCPA ( Due to the large number of observations, we use a 20% random subsample of the CCP data from 2003Q1 to 2007Q4, which constitutes a random 1% sample of all U.S. Equifax credit reports rather than the full random 5% sample. 9 The credit report variables used in our estimation are the number of open auto loans, total auto loan balance, the Equifax Risk Score, and state and county of the file holder's residence. Since detailed geographic information is available in the CCP, we conduct the analysis at the level of the federal bankruptcy court district rather than the state. There are 89 federal court districts in the 50 states, and each district has its own bankruptcy court. 10 Conducting the analysis at the district-level allows us to use variation in Chapter 13 usage across districts within a state as well as the variation across states. We use the county of the file holder's residence to determine the federal bankruptcy court district in which the borrower would file for bankruptcy. We use two measures of credit quantity aggregated to the district level: the share of borrowers within a district who obtain a new auto loan during each quarter, and the initial balance of the new auto loan. These include loans from banks, credit unions, and auto finance companies.
Our measures of credit quantity are imputed from the number of auto loan accounts and total auto loan balance. To determine new auto loans, we use the algorithm described in Lee et al. (2015) . A new auto loan is identified as either a change in the number of auto loan accounts or an increase in the total auto loan balance. We compute the initial balance on the auto loan as the size of the increase in the auto loan balance for those who obtain loans.
11 The CCP does not differentiate between auto loans and leases, so leased vehicles are included in our figures (Brown et al., 2011 . Another possible measure of Chapter 13 usage would be the average per capita Chapter 13 bankruptcies in the state. We prefer the fraction of bankruptcies under Chapter 13 because it is stable within a state over time while the per capita bankruptcy rate fluctuates with economic and credit market conditions (Dick and Lehnert, 2010, Keys, 2015) . The two measures, however, are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient of our chosen measure of Chapter 13 usage, Ch.13 j , with average Chapter 13 bankruptcies per capita from 2001-2004 is 0.87. loan each quarter, and the average size of a new loan, measured by the increase in the auto loan balance for those who obtain loans, was $10,781. Figure 2 shows the geographic variation in Chapter 13 usage. Many of the states with the highest Chapter 13 filing rates are located in the South. In the empirical analysis, we will address the concern that our estimates are driven by region-specific shocks that affect lending in the South.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that the anti-cramdown provision improves auto lenders' outcomes only in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, so its effect will be larger in states where 
where y jt is the interest rate on 48-month new car auto loans in state j in month t. The effect of eliminating cramdowns is captured by β, the coefficient on BAP CP A t × Ch.13 j . BAPCPA across the distribution of Chapter 13 usage and we attribute this heterogeneity to the impact of eliminating cramdowns. 13 X jt includes controls for economic conditions within a state that affect lending markets, namely the log of annual median income, the log of the annual home price index, and the annual state unemployment rate. All regressions include state fixed effects (δ j ) and time fixed effects (τ t ). The error term jt may have a component that is correlated within a state over time, so we cluster errors at the state-level.
BAP CP
A key issue in this identification strategy is that states' Chapter 13 usage is not randomly assigned. For example, it is possible that states with riskier borrowers have both higher interest rates on auto credit and greater usage of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The state fixed effects control for time-invariant differences between states that affect auto loan interest rates.
These time-invariant characteristics include the persistent local legal culture, population characteristics, and fixed credit market characteristics.
Conditioning on state fixed effects, identification relies on the parallel trends assumption:
if cramdowns were not eliminated, auto loan interest rates in high-13 and low-13 states would have followed parallel trends. That is, if cramdowns were not eliminated, changes in auto loan interest rates would not be correlated with historical Chapter 13 usage. This assumption would be violated if there are unobserved time-varying differences across states that are correlated with both Chapter 13 usage and auto loan interest rates. For example, we may worry that Chapter 13 usage is high in states where interest rates are trending downward.
In this scenario, our estimates would attribute these falling interest rates to the elimination of cramdowns.
We address concerns about unobserved time-varying differences across states in two ways.
First, we allow the time fixed effects to vary across the four U.S. Census regions and statespecific linear trends. By isolating variation in Chapter 13 usage within a Census region, the in Table 4 , suggest that a linear effect of Ch.13 j provides a good approximation.
region-specific time fixed effects address the concern that many of the states with historically high shares of bankruptcies under Chapter 13 are clustered in the South. If our results were driven by a region specific shock to that caused interest rates to fall in the South, these shocks would be capture by the region-specific time fixed effects.
Second, we show that, prior to BAPCPA, changes in interest rates were uncorrelated with Chapter 13 usage. To do this, we estimate an event study specification to examine the timing of changes in interest rates along the distribution of Chapter 13 usage. We expand the sample to 2004-2007 and estimate a regression that interacts Chapter 13 usage with the full set of time fixed effects:
β k captures the correlation between interest rates and Chapter 13 usage in month k relative to the omitted month, January 2004, after partialling out state fixed effects, month fixed effects, and the economic controls. 14 This specification allows us to observe the timing of changes in auto loan interest rates. If states changes in interest rates are uncorrelated with
Chapter 13 usage, the estimates of β k will be (economically and statistically) zero for the months prior to BAPCPA. In addition to lending credibility to the identification assumption, this specification allows us to observe how the impact of eliminating cramdowns varies over time. The estimates of β k for the months after BAPCPA reflect how the impact of cramdowns on interest rates changed over time.
The event-study specification tests whether the period before BAPCPA is consistent with 14 We omit January 2004 as it is the first month in this sample and reflects auto loan interest rates in states 1.5 years prior to the enactment of BAPCPA. the identification assumption (of similar pre-trends), whether interest rates changed around BAPCPA, and whether the timing of these changes coincides with the precise timing of BAPCPA. Even if pre-BAPCPA changes in interest rates are uncorrelated with Chapter 13 usage and the timing of interest rate changes coincides with BAPCPA, the changes in interest rates still may not be caused by eliminating cramdowns. BAPCPA introduced many changes to bankruptcy law in addition to the anti-cramdown provision. The time fixed effects capture the aspects of BAPCPA that uniformly affect all states. However, if the impact of other provisions of BAPCPA is correlated with Chapter 13 usage, β would capture the net effect of these provisions and cramdowns. We rule out this concern by including controls for geographic variation in the other main aspects of BAPCPA: changes in the cost of filing, the means test, and restrictions on homestead exemptions. To control for these other provisions, we interact the post-BAPCPA indicator with bankruptcies per capita, changes in attorney fees, exposure to the means test, and asset exemption levels.
Next, we estimate the effect of cramdowns on two measures of the quantity of auto credit: the share of borrowers obtaining a new loan and the average size of new loans. The empirical strategy remains the same as in the interest rate regressions, but there are two changes to the structure of the data. First, while the interest rate data are monthly, the data on the quantity of auto credit are quarterly. Second, since the CCP contains a finer level of geography, we conduct the analysis at the level of the federal court district. This allows us to take advantage of variation in Chapter 13 usage across districts within the same state, as well as the cross-state variation in Chapter 13 usage. The credit quantity sample consists of quarterly observations for the 89 federal court districts from 2003 to 2007. For federal court district d in quarter t, the regression takes the following form Since changes in bankruptcy law are more likely to affect high-risk borrowers, we also estimate regressions that allow the effect to differ for prime and subprime borrowers. For subprime status s (s =1 if subprime, 0 if prime), district d, and quarter t, these regressions take the form
By interacting subprime status with state and year fixed effects, this specification can be viewed as a triple-difference, comparing changes around BAPCPA, across Chapter 13 usage, and between subprime and prime borrowers. We weight the observations by the number of individual observations in each district-quarter-subprime cell. 
Results

Interest Rates for New Car Loans
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Columns 2-5 add controls for economic conditions and specific forms of unobserved spatial heterogeneity. Column 2 adds state-level controls for monthly unemployment rates, the log of annual median income, and the log of the annual home price index. The estimated effect is unchanged. One concern with the identification strategy is that many of the states with the highest share of Chapter 13 bankruptcies are clustered in the South. If interest rates in the South were falling relative to other regions, we would falsely attribute that to the impact of the anti-cramdown provision. Column 3 addresses this concern by including region-specific time fixed effects for the four Census regions, which identifies the impact of cramdowns entirely from variation in Chapter 13 usage within each region. Even with the inclusion of these region-specific controls, there is little change in the estimated effect. Column 4 adds controls for state-specific linear time trends, and the estimates remain similar. To interpret the magnitude of the effect in the average state, the bottom row multiplies the coefficient by the average Chapter 13 filing rate in our sample, 23%. Using this measure, the elimination of cramdowns caused interest rates to fall by 12.7-15.9 basis points in the average state.
Next, we turn to the event study regressions that examine the timing of these changes in interest rates. (2) 
Other BAPCPA Provisions and Alternative Specifications
The next set of results rules out alternative explanations for the decline in interest rates and investigates sensitivity to functional form. While the event study analysis shows that the largest change in interest rates coincides with the timing of BAPCPA, it might have been caused by provisions of BAPCPA other than the elimination of cramdowns. Table 3 investigates this possibility by including interactions of the BAPCPA indicator with additional state characteristics that cause the impact of the other main aspects of BAPCPA to vary geographically.
Column 1 reproduces the baseline specification with economic controls from Table 2 . One competing explanation for our result is that areas with a high Chapter 13 usage also tend to file more bankruptcies (Lefgren and McIntyre, 2009 ). If BAPCPA simply had a larger impact on interest rates in states with more bankruptcies, it could bias our estimates. Column 2 rules out this explanation by including the interaction of BAP CP A t with the average per capita bankruptcy filing rate (Chapter 7 plus Chapter 13) in each state from 2001-2004. Our estimated effect of cramdowns remains significant and actually increases in magnitude.
Research suggests three additional sources of geographic variation in the impact of BAPCPA: the cost of filing, the means test, and homestead exemptions. First, BAPCPA increased attorney fees, and the amount varied across states (Lupica, 2012, Albanesi and Nosal, 2015) . Second, BAPCPA's means test affected some states more than others. Third, BAPCPA restricted the use of homestead exemptions, which may cause the impact of BAPCPA to be larger in states with more lenient exemptions (Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch, 2012, Cornwell and Xu, 2014) .
Columns 3-6 interacts the BAPCPA indicator with state-level characteristics that address each of these concerns. Column 3 interacts the BAPCPA indicator with each state's change in Chapter 7 attorney's fees as reported in Lupica (2012) . Column 4 interacts it with an indicator that equals one for the 8 states that Cornwell and Xu (2014) report are most affected by the means test.
17 Column 5 interacts the BAPCPA indicator with states' homestead exemption levels, as in the identification strategy of Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2012) .
18
17 These states are California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Texas. The means test applies to individuals with income above the median income in their state after adjustments for family size. Cornwell and Xu (2014) argue that these 8 states are most affected by the means test because they have the largest share of the population with incomes between the median and mean of state income.
18 States' exemptions are coded as the level of the homestead in 2005 (in $10,000s) with a dummy indicator for the states with an unlimited homestead exemption.
Finally, column 6 includes all of the additional interactions in one regression.
19 In all of these regressions, the estimated effect of cramdowns remains negative and significant, indicating that our main estimates are not biased by geographic variation in the other main aspects of BAPCPA. A final concern is that the passage of BAPCPA coincided with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which hit in August and September 2005 and affected mostly states with a high share of Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Column 7 drops the states most affected by the hurricanes: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The estimated effect of cramdowns remains largely unchanged.
In another set of regressions, we investigate the sensitivity of our result to changes in the functional form. The specification in equation (1) assumes that the impact on interest rates is linear in Ch.13 j . Table 4 shows that linearity is a good approximation by comparing the results from the linear specification to a more flexible model that interacts the post-BAPCPA indicator with an indicator for each quintile of the Ch.13 j distribution. Column 1 reports the baseline specification. Columns 2-5 show the change in interest rates for each Chapter 13 quintile, varying the set of controls for spatial heterogeneity. To compare the magnitudes implied by the baseline specification to the more flexible quintile model, the bottom row reports the predicted change in interest rates caused by moving from the first to fifth quintile. The baseline linear specification predicts that interest rates fall by 27.6 basis points for states in the fifth quintile relative to states in the first quintile. 20 The quintile models in columns 2-5 predict that interest rates fall by 20.2-23.4 basis points. The similarity of these magnitudes suggests that linearity in Chapter 13 usage provides a good fit for estimating the impact of eliminating cramdowns.
Credit Supply
Next, we estimate the effect of eliminating cramdowns on two measures of credit quantity: the share of borrowers obtaining new auto loans and the mean size of the new loans, conditional on borrowing. Table 5 reports estimates of the effect on the quantity of credit.
Columns 1-3 show that there is a small, negative, and statistically insignificant impact on the share of borrowers obtaining a new loan. Evaluated at the mean Chapter 13 filing rate, the point estimate in column 1 implies that auto loan originations fell by 1 loan per 10,000
borrowers. The point estimates remain negative and insignificant when adding additional controls for economic conditions and state trends. Columns 4-6 show that the impact on the average size of new auto loans is positive, but also statistically insignificant. Evaluated at the mean Chapter 13 filing rate, the point estimate in Column 4 implies that the initial auto loan balances increased by $97. In Column 6, when controls for economic conditions and district-level linear time trends are included, the estimated effect of cramdowns is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.
It is possible, however, that changes in credit supply resulting from the anti-cramdown provision were concentrated among high-risk borrowers, since they are more likely to file for 20 Quintile 1 has a mean Chapter 13 ratio of 0.07 and quintile 5 has a mean Chapter 13 ratio of 0.47. The baseline specification predicts that a 0.4 increase in the Chapter 13 ratio reduces interest rates by an additional 0.4 * 68.9 = 27.6 basis points. bankruptcy. Table 6 reports the estimates from the specification that allows the effect to vary across prime and subprime borrowers. The coefficient on BAPCPA×Ch.13 captures the effect on prime borrowers, while the coefficient on BAPCPA×Ch.13×subprime captures the difference between the effect on subprime borrowers relative to the effect on prime borrowers.
Columns 1-3 show that, for both prime and subprime borrowers, the estimated effect on the number of auto loans remains negative, and statistically insignificant. In columns 4-6, however, the estimates show an increase in loan sizes for subprime borrowers relative to prime borrowers. Evaluated at the mean Chapter 13 usage of 23%, the coefficient of 616.4 in column 4 implies that eliminating cramdowns increases the size of new subprime loans by $142 relative to new prime loans. The estimate remains significant when controls for economic conditions are included in column 5. In column 6, the estimate becomes insignificant when state-by-subprime-status linear trends are included, though the point estimate increases in magnitude. These estimates provide some evidence that the anti-cramdown provision increased the size of new auto loans among subprime borrowers.
Conclusion
BAPCPA decreased the relief provided to bankruptcy filers by restricting access to bankruptcy and reducing its benefits. Proponents of BAPCPA argued that these restrictions would lead to cheaper consumer credit. In this paper, we investigate whether one of the main provisions of BAPCPA, the elimination of auto loan cramdowns in Chapter 13, reduced the price of auto loans and increased the quantity of credit. Using a new identification strategy based on persistent variation in states' use of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7, we provide the first estimates of the causal impact of eliminating cramdowns on auto credit markets.
We find that the anti-cramdown provision reduced auto loan interest rates by an average of 15 basis points, with larger declines in states with a historically higher share of bankruptcies under Chapter 13. We show that this decline occurred in the month that BAPCPA went into effect, and rule out the other major provision of BAPCPA as potential causes. Over a typical 48-month auto loan, a 15 basis point reduction translates into a 0.3% reduction in the monthly payment or a $73 reduction in total loan payments for a $22,000 loan.
21 Relative to the frequency of Chapter 13 bankruptcies, a 15 basis point reduction in interest rates is sizable. Estimates from the CCP/Equifax data indicate that only 0.8-1% of pre-BAPCPA auto loan borrowers would have been affected by the elimination of cramdowns in Chapter 13. 22 We also find some evidence that eliminating cramdowns also increased the size of auto loans, particularly among subprime borrowers. These findings support proponents' claims that BAPCPA would lead to cheaper credit.
Eliminating cramdowns may also have changed other dimensions of auto loan contracts.
An important feature of auto loans missing from our analysis is the effect on the loan term.
Auto loan terms have increased over the last decade and, in 2015, 69% of new car loans had a term greater than 60 months (Zabritski, 2015) . It is possible that prohibiting cramdowns contributed to this trend by increasing the profitability of longer loans, since longer loans 21 The monthly payment on a 48-month auto loan is given by the formula P × r 12 (1+ r 12 ) 48 / (1 + r 12 ) 48 − 1 . Reducing the interest rate from r = 0.065 to r = 0.0635 results in a 0.3% reduction in the monthly payment. For a P =$22,000, this translates into a $73 reduction in the total amount paid.
22 The anti-cramdown provision eliminates cramdowns during the first 910 days of an auto loan. Using the CCP/Equifax data, we follow the cohorts of new auto loans originated in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . For these five years, the share of these borrowers that file Chapter 13 within the first 910 days (10 quarters) ranges between 0.8% and 1%.
are more likely to become underwater.
Overall, we find that BAPCPA's anti-cramdown provision resulted in a significant decline in auto loan interest rates. Our results also demonstrate how differences in regional bankruptcy practices can alter the impact of a uniform federal law change. Although BAPCPA prohibited cramdowns in all states, the impact of this change varied due to geographic differences in local legal culture that influence whether borrowers file Chapter 13 or Chapter 7. We find that interest rates fell by 30 basis points for states in the highest quintile of Chapter 13 usage, but only by 5 basis points for states in the lowest quintile.
More generally, this paper shows that differences in local legal culture can alter the impact of uniform federal law changes. . Column 2 adds state-level controls for monthly unemployment rates, and annual log of median income and log of the home price index. Column 3 adds region×time fixed effects. Column 4 adds controls for linear state-specific time trends. The magnitude at mean shows the coefficient of BAP CP A t × Ch.13 j multiplied by the mean Chapter 13 filing rate of 0.23. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. State-level economic controls are for monthly unemployment rates, the annual log of median income, the log of the home price index, and state and month-year fixed effects. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
